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Larissa Bonfante (NYU): <i>Caligula the Etruscophile</i>	98-100
A. E. Douglas (Birmingham): <i>Three passages in Cicero, Tusculan Disputations II (16. 48-49, 49-50)</i>	101-105
G. B. A. Fletcher (Gosforth): <i>On passages in Ovid's Tristia.</i>	106-107
M. A. Greenwood (St Augustine's College, Kent): <i>Housman on Friedlander (Mart. Epigr. II, lii); an unnecessary criticism?</i>	107-108
M. R. Mezzabotta (Cape Town): <i>Johannes Burman, Catullus 3.11-14 and Virgil Aeneid 1.33</i>	109-110
Review Pamela M. Huby (Tunbridge Wells)	110-112
A. W. Price, <i>Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle</i> , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989. Pp. xiv + 264. Cloth, £22.50 ISBN 0-19-824964.	

'This number of *LCM*' is probably the last that will appear before the Editor is formally retired from full time employment by the University of Liverpool, and its late appearance, for which he must formally apologise, is in part the result of the ceremonies apparently inseparable from that event. In 'The Children of the Zodiac' in *Many Inventions* (1907) Kipling has the Bull reply, when asked 'Does Death hurt?' 'No, but dying does', words which the Editor has been inclined to apply to retirement. But now that it is, for him at least, the dead part of the Academic year, and that he can extend his sympathy to those colleagues involved in admissions, and that the Greenbank Colloquium on 19th Century Classical Scholarship in English is safely over, and seems to have been enjoyed by the participants, *LCM* can look forward to its customary aestivation, this year coupled with attendance at the 6th International Symposium on the *Odyssey*, held, of course, in Ithaka, where he will ask and answer the question 'Had the Cyclops a daughter, and was Nausicaa a giant?' and the other editor will consider 'πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς'. And he must say that rarely has the end of the academic year come more welcome.

He said 'probably' because if *LCM* 15.8 (Oct. 1990) is posted to subscribers before the 30th September he will not technically be retired. But before then he must vacate his room, and to do so will be, as those who have been allowed to see it will know, and as Otto Seeck said of the Mutilation of the Herms, *eine Arbeit*. He owes this reference, and his copy of the *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt* to his old tutor C. E. Stevens, and the relevant volume of notes (*Anhang zum dritten Bande, zweite verbesserte Auflage*, Stuttgart 1921) opened at the relevant note, to 48, 6 on p. 465. Seeck's actual words are 'Denn das Zerschlagen eines Marmorbildwerks ist eine Arbeit, die sich nicht ohne Geräusch ausführen läßt', but though formally true they are not entirely appropriate in the case of the Herms, of which only the facing bits (*τὰ πρόσωπα* as Thucydides modestly calls them, 6.27.1) were knocked off, a fate suffered by the Herm that stands, or stood, in the Ashmolean on the way to the library.

In his notes the last number of *LCM* the editor inadvertently employed the affectation of Arrius (Catullus 84) and inserted an intrusive 'h' into the first name of the late Professor

Andrewes. He apologises for the error, as for the shortness of last month's notes, which was, he has heard but does not entirely believe, regretted by readers, who will have found him in more relaxed and prolix vein this month.

Except that he must close on a slightly sombre note, since he hears a number of reports that some Universities are finding themselves with considerable deficits (that of Queen Mary College and Westfield was reported in the press as a million) at a time when no increase, but only further reductions in Government Funding are to be expected. No University is an island, and the Editor could wish that, so far from considering it *suave* to contemplate the troubles of others as long as their own institution survives, all would combine to present a United Front even at the cost of some loss of autonomy and some overall reorganisation.

Nor is this only a national problem, there being some indications that the reunification of Germany may have adverse effects on some academic institutions.



Larissa Bonfante (NYU): *Caligula the Etruscophile*

LCM 15.7 (Jul.1990), 98-100

Judging from two ancient references, Claudius' nephew shared his uncle's Etruscan interests, on a more than superficial level. When his daughter Drusilla was born, he placed the child on the lap of the statue of Athena, praying for the goddess to grant her health and success. *infantem autem, Iuliam Drusillam appellatam, per omnium dearum templa circumferens Minervae gremio imposuit alendamque et institutendam commendavit.* Suet. *Calig.* 25.7 'He named the child Julia Drusilla; and carried her around to all the temples of the goddesses in turn before entrusting her to the lap of Minerva, whom he called upon to supervise his daughter's growth and education'.

Trans. R.Graves, *The Twelve Caesars. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus*, Penguin 1957.

Minerva Mater¹ is well attested as an Etruscan divinity and clearly illustrated on bronze statuettes and engraved mirrors (Fig.1. Bronze 'candelabrum' from Chiusi with statuette of armed, winged Minerva holding a naked child on her left hand. 4th century B.C.. I.Roulez, *Ann.Inst.* 1872, pl.N). In fact figures of *kourotrophoi*, and of nursing mothers, are frequent in Italy; they are extremely rare in Greek art.

Caligula was also a passionate admirer of Etruscan painting. In an account of ancient painting in Italy, Pliny writes of paintings 'older than the city of Rome' in the temples of Ardea. Figures from a mural by the same artist, from Lanuvium, were coveted by Caligula, who evidently saw them *in situ*. He was 'fired by passion by two nude figures of Atalanta and Helen, painted side by side. They were very beautiful, and in excellent condition, though the building they decorated was in ruins. Indeed', says Pliny, 'he would have removed them, if the composition of the plaster wall had allowed it'.

similiter Lanivi, ubi Atalante et Helena comminus pictae sunt nudaе ab eodem artifice, utraque excellentissima forma, sed altera ut virgo, ne ruinis quidem templi concussae. Gaius princeps tollere eas conatus est libidine accensus, si tectori natura permisisset.

Pliny NH 35.17-18

Fig.1



¹ R.Enking, 'Minerva Mater', *JdI* 59-60 (1944-45), 111-124; A.N.Zadoks-Josephus Jitta, *BABesch* 59 (1984), 69-72.

It has been noted that this description fits Etruscan art of the fourth and third century B.C., in which naked figures and divinities and heroines frequently appear. Etruscan mirrors, in particular, show images of Helen, Aphrodite, and other groups of graceful, naked figures from the fourth century and the Hellenistic period. Atalanta, undressed, wearing bikini pants or pants and bra, also appears on numerous mirrors, wrestling with Peleus, or alone.

On the actual date of the murals, see Brendel's comment: 'Pliny, *NH* 35.17, probably overrated the age of the murals in Lanuvium which represented Helen and Atalanta nude, side by side; though he may have been right in likening them to the murals at Ardea. . . . The iconography which he describes is Etruscan late Classical, at the earliest; more likely, Etruscan-Hellenistic'. *Etruscan Art*, Penguin 1978, 474.

For the composition, see the commentary of Jex-Blake and Sellers: 'One may conjecture that the Atalanta and Helen had once formed part of a larger composition. . . . Engelman (esp. Roscher, i, p.1964) conjectures that the painting had originally represented a mortal counterpart of the "Judgment of Paris" . . . Certainly four-figure scenes were extremely popular on Etruscan mirrors of the fourth and third centuries B.C.; after ca. 300 B.C. we see many groups of young nude figures, sometimes labeled by inscriptions identifying them as divinities and other characters of Greek mythology. Helen is a very popular figure on these engraved Etruscan mirrors.

Atalanta is also a frequent figure, whose nudity is a recurrent feature (*LIMC* s.v. 'Atalante', p.949 no.93: Fig.2. Bronze mirror with engraved decoration. Atropos [*Athropa*] hammers the nail of fate in the presence of two lovers, Atalanta and Meleager [*Atalanta, Meliacr*] and Venus and Adonis [*Turan, Atunis*]. Ca. 320 B.C.. Berlin, Antiquarium. Beazley, *JHS* 69 [1949], 12, fig.15; G.Bonfante and L.Bonfante, *Etruscan Language* [1983], fig.25. The combination of figures is not a traditional Greek one. Note the nude Atalanta.)

Though the two are not found together on any known mirrors, one parallel from art does exist showing the two as part of the same composition. A Praenestine cista of rather poor manufacture, in Berlin, has a group of nude figures, identified as (Paris) Alexander, Atalanta, Helen, and Alsir (the last holds an apple, while her other hand makes the *pudica* gesture). Gabriella Bordennache Battaglia (*Ciste Praenestine* I, 1979, No.9, Fr.542, p.65) holds the scene to be 'indecifrabile'. Boardman and Arrigoni, on the other hand, read in it a Judgment of Paris, 'in what appears to be a beauty contest, echoed in the picture at Lanuvium' (*LIMC*, 'Atalante' 93).




Fig.2

There is another possibility. The figures could have been similar to those painted in the François Tomb of Vulci (see now the Vatican exhibit catalogue, F.Buranelli, ed., *La Tomba François di Vulci*, Rome 1987). Aside from the fact that a beautiful (fragmentary) naked Cassandra threatened by the sword of Ajax (Fig.3) gives a good idea of the figures Caligula fell in love with – and why – we see here ‘parallel’ figures from Greek mythology, for example, Phoinix and Nestor. Such a composition may explain how Helen and Atalanta happened to be next to each other (how Atalanta was shown to be a *virgo* is another problem). In fact this scene, which is unusual in substituting an image of Aphrodite for the traditional statue of Athena, again shows the freedom with which Etruscans ‘adapted’ Greek myths to their own ideas, customs and purposes (most of which are forever lost to us).

Taken together, the two references present a picture of Caligula as quite knowledgeable about antiquities of early Italy, especially Etruscan. Such a picture fits his uncle, Claudius.² Caligula may well have derived this information from Claudius’ books on the Etruscans. Both anecdotes, however, show him acting on such information. He wanted to have Minerva’s protection for his daughter. He evidently went to see the ancient paintings, in a Roman site but in an Etruscan style, and hoped to bring them home with him. He had the good sense to desist, where a modern *tombarolo* (were the paintings in a temple or a tomb?) would have probably insisted. Yet we only know about this attempt at all, probably, because the prudish Romans could accuse the Emperor of lechery, assuming the pictures of the nude women to be erotic.

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


Fig.3. Wall painting from the François Tomb, Vulci. Ajax and Cassandra. After a copy by Carlo Crespi, 1862. Ca. 325 B.C.. Buranelli, fig.68.

² A. Momigliano, *Claudius the Emperor*; M. Griffin, 'Claudius in Tacitus', unpublished lecture given at Columbia University, New York, 16 Feb. 1989.

A. E. Douglas (Birmingham): *Three passages in Cicero, Tusculan Disputations II* (16. 48-49, 49-50) LCM 15.7 (Jul.1990), 101-105

1. §16 After the usual preface and preliminary exchanges, Cicero's interlocutor, in his role as 'fall guy' for this type of discourse, properly called a *schola* (*Tusc. Disp.* 1.7, cf. *Fin.* 2.2 on the current Academic practice) is made to assert that pain is the greatest evil. 'What about *dedecus*?' retorts Cicero, and the reply is an immediate retraction. The interlocutor could, and any Epicurean would, have said much more, but Cicero had already covered this ground in *De Finibus* 1 and 2. In *Tusc. Disp.* 2 he is content with digressive sniping at Epicurus, often repeating material from *De Finibus* 2. The real object of the discussion is to accept that pain is a fact of life and an unpleasant one (so that the Stoic view that it is not an 'evil' gets as short shrift as the Epicurean), and to consider ways of coping with it.

None the less the full discussion on which Cicero now embarks starts (§15) with a reference to 'the feeble views of many philosophers of different schools', and mentions as hedonists Aristippus (the elder), Epicurus, and Hieronymus of Rhodes (nominally a Peripatetic, but an unorthodox one, *Fin.* 5.14). All the others – except Zeno, Aristo, and Pyrrho, i.e. the Stoic founder and two unorthodox Stoics who concurred with Zeno on the question of pain, that it was not an 'evil' at all – agreed with 'what you have just said, that pain is an evil but not the worst of evils'.

Now comes (§16) a sentence which I believe has been consistently misinterpreted. As commonly printed it runs:

ergo id quod natura ipsa et quaedam generosa virtus statim respuit, ne scilicet dolorem summum malum diceret oppositumque dedecore sententia depelleret, in eo magistra vitae philosophia tot saecula permanet.

This is usually taken to mean 'though that [the hedonistic view] your nature and quite aristocratic excellence immediately rejected so that you didn't say that pain was the greatest evil and were immediately driven from your opinion when confronted with disgrace, yet philosophy has continued in it for many centuries'.

There are several difficulties, so great indeed that Giusta in his edition (Turin 1984), almost alone in recognising them, rewrites as follows: . . . *respondit ut non esse dolorem* . . . I think that not so much change is necessary, though I would accept his *esse* in preference to Bentley's widely accepted *scilicet* for *Mss se* (*Mss* also have *dicere* and *depellere*, but these changes are uncontroversial). But I agree with Giusta's implied understanding of the passage as a whole, and, especially as he does not devote space to his reasons, I give my own account.

The usual interpretation involves the following: (i) an abrupt change in the *ne*-clause to a positive, 'so that you did not say . . . and were in fact driven . . .'. Anacoloutha of this and more startling kinds, and other illogicalities, e. g. zeugma, some intentional, some perhaps unconscious, are common in *Tusc. Disp.*, and Giusta is, I think, too anxious to tidy them all away – they are commoner in *Tusc. Disp.* 2 than in 5, and that is likely to be due not to some inconsistent behaviour of copyists but to the far greater care Cicero took in composing the climactic final book. But one wonders why Cicero did not simply say, as the textbooks recommend for what seems much more like a clause of Result than of Purpose, *ut . . . negares*; (ii) *ergo* has to look back *beyond* the preceding sentence, to refer to the hedonists; but (iii) far more important is that *philosophia* must here refer, as commentators accept, only to *some* philosophers, the ones with whom Cicero had no sympathy, whence it follows that (iv) *magistra vitae* must be ironical: 'look where philosophy, our teacher in the art of living, has been spending all this time'. This I hold to be quite impossible, and I believe that Cicero is saying something very different. It must be the *rejection* of hedonism on which philosophy has in general been consistent.

If this view is correct, difficulties vanish. (i) 'Though' and 'yet', which appear in the version above and in King's Loeb translation, but are not in the Latin, can disappear; (ii) *ergo* can be given a more natural place. On any view Cicero has not kept his promise to set out the

views of 'many' hedonistic philosophers, but names three from the doxographical tradition which he could reproduce automatically at this stage of his philosophical writing. But he goes on to say that *ceteri*, all the rest (except Stoics who took an even stronger line against hedonism) . . . etc.. Therefore your rejection is in tune with the history of philosophy in general; (iii) there is no abrupt transition in the *ne*-clause 'you rejected it, so-as-not-to say . . . and so-as-to be driven', i.e. he has abandoned his first impulsive declaration (Giusta achieves the same by his *respondit*: 'your denying . . . has been the consistent position of philosophy'); (iv) the words *magistra vitae* are not, as I shall argue they cannot be, ironical; (v) the transition to the next sentence: *quod huic officium . . . erit tanti quod adipisci cum dolore corporis velit qui dolorem summum malum sibi esse persuaserit?* follows naturally, where on the orthodox view one might expect an adversative conjunction to introduce it.

It remains to defend my conviction that Cicero *could* not have meant what a long-standing consensus has taken him to mean. In *Tusc. Disp.* Cicero repeatedly makes the highest claims for philosophy, often implying, e. g. in the substitution of *ratio* for *oratio* in echoing Pacuvius' line which ends *regina rerum oratio* (§47), or even saying that it ranks above oratory (2.5, 3.3, 5.104). Of *philosophers* he has less consistently kindly things to say, and to point the contrast it is well to look at his use of the Greek word *philosophus* first.

It can be a simple descriptive name for Greek philosophers (3.45, 49, 68, 69, and often in *Tusc. Disp.* 5), but is often used with a hint of disparagement: in 1.11 of philosophers who waste time refuting legends about the Underworld, in 1.34, they write books about contempt for fame but still put their names to them, in 1.48 *philosophi* are Epicureans who think Epicurus did something wonderful in attacking the Underworld myths, and in 2.11-12, in direct contrast with *philosophia*, philosophers, even *perfecti*, all too rarely practise what they preach.

But *philosophia*, as that last reference shows, is a very different matter. In the *Tusculans* she really ought to have a capital letter and be referred to as 'she'. King's translation wavers between 'it' and 'she' – there is of course no problem in most other Western languages in which 'philosophy' is inescapably feminine. 'She' is indeed described in some remarkable personifications, and not only in the justly famous prose 'hymn' at 5.5. A 'hymn' it is, for if Cicero is not addressing a goddess (*ad te confugimus, a te opem petimus, tibi nos ut antea magna ex parte sic nunc penitus totosque tradimus*) it is difficult to see what he is doing.

Elsewhere she can talk (1.7), is inflamed with a desire for knowledge (1.45), and is the mother of the arts (1.64). She is content to have few to judge her and shuns the mob, who suspect and hate her (2.4, and a less striking personification at the end of that section). She cures souls (2.11), and her role as healer is constantly stressed, as at e.g. 2.43, 3.1-6, 84, 4.58, 83-4 – in 4.58 remedies being applied by (Latin *a*) her. Also in 2.11, a passage briefer but only a little less impassioned than 5.5, she removes pointless anxiety, frees from bad desires, drives away fear.

At 2.13 she is *cultura animi*, which is in turn personified, cleaning the soil of weeds, ploughing and sowing. Terence is quoted (3.30-31), and we are told that he gets his ideas from philosophy, which has just been described as *praestans ac divina sapientia*, and at 3.34 *sapientia* and *philosophia* are again identified (which never seems to happen to the *philosophus* and the *sapiens*), and have a *munus* and an *officium* respectively.

At 4.83 she is both physician and farmer. In 5.5. we note that she has a bosom (*sinus*), and to describe her Cicero invents two feminine nouns of actor (*actrix*?), *indagatrix* and *expultrix*, and revives *inventrix*, giving to philosophy the sole role in the establishment of civilisation, of which he had given at least a share in earlier days to oratory (*inv.* 1.2-3, while 'Crassus' in *De Or.* 1.30-34 goes even further, but to be rebutted at considerable length by 'Scaevola', 35ff.). In 5.10 Socrates has brought her down from heaven (a goddess therefore, even if Cicero is also referring to Socrates' abandonment of the study of *meteora* as fruitless, in order to concentrate on human ethics), placed her in cities and brought her into our homes. After all this we must surely accept at 5.19 the reading of a minority of Mss *a*, not *in*, *philosophia* – the utterances and promises must be made *by* philosophy. On all this we should compare Seneca's equally impressive tribute to *sapientia*, *ep.* 90, 26-29.

The vision fades: at 5.34 and 113 the divinity is reduced to a mere common noun. But she, or it, is never, unlike her (its) sometimes unsatisfactory practitioners, the object of ironical or any other criticism, and should be treated accordingly at 2.16.

To our text, then. The traditional view leaves *id quod* suspended in anacolouthon, and there is, to repeat, nothing abnormal in this, but if it is correctly argued that *id quod* could not mean what I believe Cicero is saying, i.e. 'your rejection', not 'the view which you rejected', but *quod* alone could, I should welcome the disappearance of *id*: *quod* then becomes 'as for your rejection . . . in it . . .', the right sense and (since I can find no example to save the *id*) better syntax.

2. §§ 48-9.

(i) Cicero is arguing that the rational way to face pain as distinct from the method of habit and training which he has been discussing, is for reason to control the irrational, and he avails himself of the doctrine of the bipartite division of the soul into those two parts. So 'Just how?', you will say. Either as a master controls a slave, or a general a ranker, or a parent a son'. So far, so good. But there follows a passage where these examples are elaborated in a complicated and not altogether satisfactory way.

Conventionally the text reads:

si turpissime se illa pars animi geret quam dixi esse mollem, si se lamentis muliebriter lacrimisque dedet, vinciat et constringatur amicorum propinquorumque custodiis; saepe enim videmus fractos pudore qui ratione nulla vincerentur. ergo hos quidem ut famulos vinclis prope ac custodia, qui autem erunt firmiores nec tamen robustissimi, hos admonitu oportebit ut bonos milites revocatos dignitatem tueri.

If the irrational element takes over – here in a feeble reaction to pain, not the more positive and passionate *epithumiai* more familiar in such contexts – it must be restrained like lunatics in Roman law and practice (*Phil.* 2.9, *Pis.* 48 with Nisbet's n.). Cicero then makes a transition from the parts of the soul to types of person, the transition being prepared by *saepe . . . vincerentur*. This seems to mean that in the irrational, excessive lamentation cannot *ex hypothesi* be controlled by reason, but can be by the constraints of shame before others, corresponding to the chains.

However, in the next sentence (*ergo . . .*) the tying up of the feeble is now compared to the treatment of slaves, not lunatic relatives (presumably children, if the parallel with *parens filio* is to be maintained), and contrasted with good soldiers guilty of a temporary lapse in discipline. In this way Cicero works in all three of his parallels though with some untidiness. As applied to slaves, chains are surely a stronger kind of discipline than an appeal to shame, and one supposes that the appeal to *soldiers* would be to *pudor*, cf. close at hand (§50) *pudens* of a conscientious soldier confronted by his commander, the emphatic last word of its sentence – a clear back reference, just as the *iustus parens* reappears (§51), though slaves do not.

But I am more concerned with the linguistic and grammatical difficulties which the second sentence above, as transmitted, has presented to commentators, editors and translators.

One approach is to assume an anacolouthon and supply mentally what Cicero omitted when his rapidity of thought outran his concern for accuracy of expression. This could be Kühner's *adstringi*, accepted as plausible by Dougan, and with it *oportebit* extracted from the second half of the sentence. This involves a perhaps insignificant shift between *hos adstringi oportebit* ('it will be necessary that these . . .') and *hos oportebit dignitatem tueri* ('it will be necessary for these to . . .'). But it is also to be noted that the not very common word *admonitu*, which on this and several other interpretations has a passive force, 'by being advised', is otherwise cited only with an active ('by advising'). That this is the natural 'feel' of the word is shown in King's Loeb translation considered below.

It is also possible to make *oportebit* straightforwardly govern both occurrences of *hos*, so that *dignitatem tueri* is the 'duty' of both groups, e. g. by reading with Lundström (*Zur Text-*

Kritik der Tusculanen, Uppsala 1986, pp.121-2) *prope adstrictos*. The problem here, again shared with some other views, e. g. Humbert's Budé translation, is the doubly impossible notion that slaves had *dignitas* to protect and that they would achieve that in chains. Again, *admonitu* has passive force.

Next, there are free renderings such as King's: 'such persons therefore we shall have to keep in chains and guard closely like slaves, whilst those . . . we shall have to warn to be mindful of honour like good soldiers recalled to duty'. As a paraphrase of what Cicero seems to have meant, but failed, to say, that is not far from the mark, but it can hardly be got out of the Latin. It makes *tueri* govern the first *hos*, but *tueri* never seems to be cited except in a favourable and protective sense, unlike, as it happens, the English 'keep an eye on', which it resembles in its basic sense; in the second half it governs *dignitatem*, not the second *hos*, which is left grammatically stranded. Lastly, 'to duty' is not in the Latin, and cannot be supplied. *revocare* is used of troops when the context is clear, e. g. of veterans recalled to the colours (L&S s.v. 2a, OLD 1.b), but nowhere absolutely in the sense 'recall to duty'. Giusta rewrites the sentence as follows: *ut famulos vinclis propinqui amicique custodiant*.

This removes many of the difficulties and his interpretation of *revocatos* is subtle: it refers to recalling advanced troops to regroup, a manoeuvre in which they must be especially careful to 'preserve their dignity', but I find this hard to accept. I have considered reading with Bake <ad> *dignitatem*. The object of *oportebit* would be understood as *nos* or persons unspecified. *dignitas* can be used of 'appropriate behaviour', and in Cicero's philosophical writings be equivalent to *virtus*, cf. *Verr.* 1.28, *off.* 1.67, *Tusc. Disp.* 2.31, 46, Madvig on *Fin.* 3.1, who cites *De Or.* 3.62, *part. or.* 90. Against this we still have the doubtful zeugmatic use of *tueri*, and more seriously, *dignitatem tueri* has all the appearance of a standard collocation (e. g. *Att.* 1.19.6, *Mil.* 34), and I am not prepared to urge that that very fact could explain the omission of an *ad*.

So we come back to the postulated anacolouthon, but with the real break coming at *oportebit*, not at *custodia*, though Cicero's thought is already turning to the soldier-simile. At *oportebit* Cicero slides from something like 'we must treat' or 'control' with advice (*admonitu* treated as active) to a completely different image and a different construction of *oportebit*, from what on this view we must do to what the *firmitiores* must do for themselves. There remains the difficulty about *revocatos*: should we read *revocatos* <ad officium> or <ad virtutem> *dignitatem tueri*?

3. §§49-50 *non nimis in Niptris ille sapientissimus Graeciae saucius lamentatur vel modice potius:*

*Pedetemptim, inquit, et sedato nisu
Ne succussu adripiat maior
dolor . . .*

*Pacuvius hos melius quam Sophocles – apud illum perquam flebiliter
Ulixes lamentatur in vulnere . . . (50) itaque in extremis Niptris
alios quoque obiurgat (sc. Ulixes) idque moriens .*

It is clear from these passages, from Aulus Gellius 13.31.3, and several citations in grammarians, that Pacuvius wrote a play called *Niptra*, based on Sophocles and dealing with a wounded and dying Odysseus (*Remains of Old Latin* 2.264-272). It is presumably this play which Cicero quotes again at *Tusc. Disp.* 5.46:

*et ea quae Anticlea laudat Ulixi pedes abluens:
lenitudo orationis, mollitudo corporis*

and Aulus Gellius 2.26.13, citing Pacuvius, though not naming the play:

*cedo tuum pedem <mi> lymphis flavis fulvum ut pulverem
manibus isdem, quibus Ulixi saepe permulsi, abluam
lassitudinemque minuam manuum mollitudine.*

A Sophoclean *Niptra* is known from one reference and a few uninformative words (Radt 4.373-4). However, because of the reference in Cicero to Odysseus' death, it has often been treated (and is so treated in standard works still likely to be consulted), as identical with the rather better attested *Odysseus Akanthoplēx* (Radt 4.374-8), which, as the name reveals, told of Odysseus's death at the hands of Telegonus (his son by Circe), who in ignorance of this father's identity shot him with the poisoned bone of a sting-ray. This play is also presumed to be the one referred to by Aristotle (*poet.* 1452b29) under the title *Traumatias Odusseus* ('Odysseus Wounded'), though C.Collard has expressed doubt (*JHS* 90 [1970], p.27 n.35): 'Can there have been a *third* title current for one play of Sophocles?'.

The fragment in Gellius 2.26.13 virtually ensures that the bath is the one in *Odyssey* 19.349ff., and that it is Eurycleia speaking before recognising Odysseus. The speaker's task, it is to be noted, is to deal with dust and weariness, not with a wound: it is of course an *old scar* which figures in Homer.

It has however been questioned whether Sophocles, granted that he departed from the normal practice of Attic tragedy by dealing with a theme fully handled in Homer – which may have to be accepted in this case – would have combined events so far apart in mythological time as Odysseus' return to Ithaca and his death (so Radt on *Niptra*, though on *Odysseus Akanthoplēx* he merely reports as widely accepted the view originated by Brunck that the two plays are identical). Yet, just as it is scarcely doubtful that the bath is the Homeric one, so it is quite certain that both Sophocles and Pacuvius described Odysseus wounded and in great pain. Given that Cicero does not explicitly attribute the echoes of Sophocles in Pacuvius to a Sophoclean *Niptra*, but only to Sophocles, it seems reasonable to take the view that it was Pacuvius who, under the single title *Niptra*, took the story from Odysseus' return to his death (naturally *in extremis Niptris*), borrowing material from two Sophoclean plays – hardly perhaps a trilogy, though we do seem to have three titles, and in any case, as with the Theban plays, not necessarily the products of a single period of Sophocles's career.

A final point. At *Tusc.Disp.* 5.46 Cicero says that it was Anticle(i)a, which was the name of Odysseus' mother, who washed his feet. We must not be hypnotised by Homer, and I have been tempted to imagine that in some version of the legend, Anticleia, in the *Odyssey* dead and encountered by Odysseus in Hades (*Od.* 11.152ff.), survived (like the Jocasta of Euripides' *Phoenissae*). But whoever gave Odysseus a bath, it must surely have been a nurse or a maidservant. Some may find it suggestive that a vase-painting, often noted in this connexion, shows Odysseus being bathed by an *Antiphata* (cf. *ROL* 2.267, Webster, *Monuments* [2nd edn. 1961], p.150).

That there is a mistake in *Tusc.Disp.* 5.46 seems clear, but its origin and nature remain uncertain. Was Cicero himself responsible (so Lundström, *Eranos* 58 [1960], pp.60-79), or Pacuvius, or did it come in at some other stage of the development of the tradition?

Note: Alberto Grilli in his recent edition of *Tusculans* 2 (Brescia 1987) follows the conventional view of the first passage, on the second he accepts anacolouthon as typical of rapid spoken language, though unconcerned about the use of *admonitu* and *revocatos*, and puts the break at *custodia*, not *admonitu*; aware of the problem about the *Niptra*, he forbears to discuss it in detail – the main emphasis of his commentary is on points of language and style, and on Greek sources and parallels for Cicero's thought.

G. B. A. Fletcher (Gosforth): *On passages in Ovid's Tristia.*

LCM 15.7 (July 1990), 105-107

I give some additions to G.Luck's commentary on Ovid's *Tristia* together with correction of some of the mistakes which I have noticed.

1.1.27 *invenies aliquem qui me suspirat ademptum*. *suspirat* means 'sighs with regret that'. Cf. Lucr.2.1164-5 *suspirat arator | crebrius in cassum magnum cecidisse laborem* and Valerius Flaccus 1.1333 *nec Iove maiorem nasci suspirat Achillem*. Luck quotes Juvenal 11.152 *suspirat longo non uisam tempore matrem* where *suspirat* means 'sighs with regret for' with which may be compared Tibullus 1.6.35 *te tenet, absentes alios suspirat amores*.

1.1.120 *fortunae uultum . . . meae*. Luck quotes Manil.5.483. Cf. Val.Max.2.6.8 *hilarem fortunae uultum*.

1.2.30 *Notus aduersa proelia fronte gerit*. Cf. Lucr.6.117 *frontibus . . . aduersis*.

1.2.73 *mare considat*. Luck quotes Prop.1.8.13 *atque ego non uideam tales subsidere uentos*. Cf. Sil.17.290 *tumidi considunt gurgite fluctus*.

1.3.10 *non aptae profugo uestis opisue fuit*. Luck says that *opis* in the singular and meaning 'money' is without parallel. Cf. Plaut. *Capt.*15 *uos qui potestis ope uestra censerier*.

1.3.18 *indignas . . . genas*. Luck says that *indignus* is not found before Ovid in the sense of *immemeritus*, 'innocent' or 'undeserving'. Cf. Plaut. *Curc.*513, Cic. *Tusc.*4.46, Hor. *Sat.*2.2.103, Lucr. 2.1104, Sall. *Cat.*51.27.

1.3.21 *luctus*. For the plural cf. Catull.64.226, Cic. *De Off.*1.32, *Tusc.*3.58, Mart.6.68.2, Juv. 10.244.

1.3.84 *profugae . . . rati*. Cf. Tib. 2.5.40 *profugis . . . ratibus*, Ov. *M.*13.627 *profuga . . . classe*.

1.8.12 *adfluctum . . . fuit tantus adire timor*. Luck quotes examples of *pudor* and *furor* with an infinitive. For *timor* cf. Ov.*M.*2.66, Luc.6.666, Stat. *T.*9.423.

1.8.14 *exsequias prosequerere*. For the verb Luck quotes Apul. *M.*4.34 *toto prosequente populo uiuum producit funus*. Cf. Cic. *Clu.*201 *mater exsequias illius funeris prosecuta*, Petron. 111.2 *funus passis prosequi crinibus*, Sen. *Ep.*30.5, Justin. 11.12.6 *exsequias . . . benigne prosecutum*.

1.11.22 *exposcit uotis . . . opem*. Cf. Livy 2.35.5 *precibus . . . exposcentes*, Virg. *A.*3.261 *uotis precibusque . . . exposcere pacem*.

2.221-3 For *ea . . . ut* Luck cites Luc.1.171 *is . . . quem*. Earlier examples of *is . . . ut* are in Cic. *Ac.*10.11.1 and Nepos *Eum.*4.3.

2.225 *Illyris ora*. Luck says that the adjective is found in late Latin and cites Ausonius and Sidonius Apollinaris. It is in Luc. 2.624 and Sil. 8.290.

2.239 *si . . . uacuum tibi forte fuisset*. Luck quotes Tac. *H.*2.38.1 *opes concupiscere uacuum fuit* but not Sall. *H.*1.12 *simultates exercere uacuum fuit*, although it is quoted by Owen.

2.256 *ad delinquendum doctior esse potest*. Cf. Plaut. *Epid.*378 *nimis doctus illic ad male faciendum*.

2.574 *patria . . . salus*. For *salus* Luck quotes Martial 2.91.1 and 5.1.7. Owen quoted Cic. *post red. ad Quir.*11 *Lentulus . . . salus nostrae uitae*. Cf. also Sen. *Herc.*622 *certa et uera Thebarum salus*.

3.4.44 *amicitias . . . iunge*. Luck quotes Lucr.5.1019. Cf. Livy 1.45.2, 23.33.6.

3.5.11 *uidi ego confusos uultus*. Luck cites or quotes Luc.8.108, Petron.101 and Val.Max. 3.1. *Ext.*1. Cf. also, for example, Livy 41.15.1 *confuso uultu*, Stat. *T.*2.234 *confundit uultus*.

3.5.21 *di tibi posse tuos tribuant defendere semper*. Luck cites Valerius Flaccus 1.231 for the construction with *tribuent*. Cf. also Sen. *Med.*33-34.

3.7.15 *Pegasidas . . . undas*. Cf. Mart. 9.58.6 *tu fueris Musis Pegasis unda meis*.

3.10.71 *pampinea . . . umbra*. Luck mentions *Copa* 21 and Nemesianus *Ecl.*4.46 but not Virg.*Ecl.*7.58.

3.11.9 *commercia linguae*. Luck cites Lucan and Statius but not Livy 1.18.3, 9.36.6, 25.33.3.

4.1.105-6 *carmen . . . consule boni*. Luck gives only examples of *boni consulere* that are later

than Ovid. Cf. Plaut. *Truc.* 429 and Varro *LL.* 7.4.

4.7.2 *peregit iter*. Luck quotes Prop. 3.10.32 but not Hor. *Sat.* 2.6.99.

4.8.3 *anni fragiles*. Luck quotes Sil. 14.85 *fragili . . . senecta* but not Stat. *Silu.* 2.1.148 *Parcis fragiles urgentibus annos* or Sil. 3.386 *aeui fragilis*.

4.8.13 *haec mea sic quondam peragi sperauerat aetas*. Luck quotes Cic. *De Orat.* 3.95 but admits that the text is uncertain. Cf. Plaut. *Truc.* 936 *si hanc tecum esse speras*, Sall. *H.* 4.69.2 *frustra mala mea cum bonis tuis misceri sperem*.

5.7.20 *iunctum lateri*. Luck says that *iunctus* with a dative is found only in Ovid. Cf. Hor. *Carm.* 1.4.6 *iunctae . . . Nymphis Gratiae*, 3.19.16-17 *Gratia nudis | iuncta sororibus*. Livy 5.34.7 *iuncta caelo iuga*, Cels. 5.26.20d *iunctam ei cutem*, Calp. *Ecl.* 7.39-40 *lateri . . . forte sinistro | iunctus erat*, Curt. 9.1.13 *iunctum erat flumini nemus*, Octavia 703 *lateri iunctus*.

5.7.28 *in plausus ambitiosa*. Luck quotes only another example in Ovid of *ambitiosus in*. Cf. Cic. *Q. fr.* 1.2.4 *in Graecos . . . ambitosum* and Livy 2.41.8 *ambitiosus in socios*.

5.7.57 *desuetudine*. Luck says that this word is not found before Ovid and gives examples in the younger Pliny and Fronto but does not quote Livy 1.19.2.

5.9.1 Luck says that after Hor. *Sat.* 2.6.8 Ovid has *o si* here and in *Met.* 9.487 and 14.192. It is also in Virg. *A.* 11.415.

5.9.24 *multa luce*. Luck quotes Tac. *H.* 5.22.3 but not Sall. *H.* 3.96.

5.10.18 *ingenio . . . loci*. Luck cites a passage in Tacitus and one in Florus but not Sall. *H.* 3.228 or Livy 28.12.11.

5.10.38 *rident stolidi uerba Latina Getae*. Luck's comment on *stolidi* is 'offenbar nur hier in der elegischen Dichtung'. Cf. Prop. 2.16.8 *stolidum pleno uellere carpe pecus*.

5.14.5 *legar*. Luck says 'Ovid scheint der erste Autor zu sein, der das Verb persönlich verwendet, danach Quint. 10.1.96'. There are examples in Cic. *De Orat.* 1.158 *legendi . . . poetae*, 3.39, *p. Scauro* 5, *Brutus* 65, *Acad.* 1.10, *De Fin.* 1.8.

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M.A.Greenwood (St Augustine's College, Kent): *Housman* LCM 15.7 (Jul.1990), 107-108
on Friedlander (Mart. Epigr. II, lii); an unnecessary criticism?

I am most grateful to Dr D.W. T. Vessey, who kindly read an early draft of this note.

*novit loturos Dasius numerare: poposcit
mammosam Spatalem pro tribus: illa dedit.
loturas Ital.*¹

Martial *Epigr.* II, lii is an epigram of some wit. Effortlessly straightforward in its structure (three successive statements),² the point is surely discernible to anyone who comes across it: Spatale³ is so well endowed as to be legitimately charged three admission fees at the

¹ Explained in Lindsay's *sigla* as = *Italorum doctorum coniecturas et libri impressi qui exhibent* (W.M.Lindsay, *M. Val. Martialis Epigrammata*, Oxford Classical Texts 1929 [2nd ed.])

² I am inclined to disagree with the decision of Jens Kruuse ('*L'Originalité Artistique de Martial: son style, sa composition, sa technique*', *Classica et Mediaevalia* 4 [1941], 248-300 at 280) who places the poem in the structural group '*Les épigrammes à deux parties, où la première partie (l'exposition) est un propos et la deuxième (la conclusion) un commentaire y relatif*'. I should rather like to see it among those listed on p.282 in '*un groupe des épigrammes à trois parties [qui] commence par un propos, qui est suivi de deux commentaires*'. Though the point is a moot one.

³ The name appears only here in Martial, and rarely elsewhere in Latin (Denys Page, *The Epigrams of Rufinus*, CUP 1978, has full chapter and verse of other occurrences of *παταλ*-forms with reference, clearly, to the word's (in-)frequency in Rufinus). Lewis and Short s.v. *Spatale* correctly cite also Claud. *Epithal. de nupt. Hon. August.* 167, where Platnauer's Loeb edition (vol.1, p.254) gives *Psamathe ad loc.*, on which see now J.B.Hall, *Prolegomena to Claudian*, BICS suppl. no.45, 1986, p.165 and p.266 for full details.

baths. Her breasts are each charged separately,, as it were, and are each given single-bather status. There is my stab at the point.⁴

Friedlaender (*M. Valerii Martialis Epigrammaton Libri*, Leipzig 1886, p.264) explains the couplet similarly thus: '*Dasius is der Einnehmer des Eintrittsgeldes in einem Frauenbade. Er fordert von Statale das Dreifache, weil sie so viel Raum einnimmt wie drei gewöhnliche Badende*,⁵ und sie erkennt selbst die Gerechtigkeit seiner Forderung an.' I see no problem here: Housman apparently did. For in 'Corrections and Explanations of Martial', *J.Ph.* 30 (1907) 229-261 at 234 (= *The Classical Papers of A.E.Housman* coll. and ed. by J.Diggle and F.R.D.Goodyear, CUP 1972, vol.II, p.715) he writes: 'Similarly at II 52 2 he [Friedlaender] has missed the force of *tribus* and set me writing a note which I now cancel because I find the true explanation in the Delphin edition, "*Spatale et duae illius mammae trium locum occupabant*".'

For me there is nothing, essentially, in the latter that is lacking in Friedlaender, *trium locum occupabant* being virtually the same as *Raum einnimmt wie drei*. I understand neither Housman's dissatisfaction with Friedlaender's explanation nor his preference for that offered by the Delphin. And if the German scholar 'has missed the force of *tribus*', then so, I am afraid, have I. Furthermore, if sensitivity to that 'force' is absent from Friedlaender, but is contained in the line from the Delphin, then, in my opinion, it has not surfaced revealingly. Granted the latter does include specific reference to Spatale's most identifying feature, *duae illius mammae* where Friedlaender does not, but did he need to spell it out? ⁶ (We shall be wondering next, if we are not careful, whether the man even noticed *mammosam*, let alone understood the word's meaning and import!). When Friedlaender wrote '*weil sie so viel Raum einnimmt wie drei gewöhnliche Badende*' *sie* was written to stand for 'Spatale, having as she does such large breasts'. *Sie* must obviously have this inclusive sense, fully dependent upon the adjective *mammosam*, since any misunderstanding of this particular adjective (and consequently an oversight of the force of *tribus*) could not lead to any firm assurance that '*sie so viel Raum einnimmt . . .*' etc..

I cautiously suggest a hasty (or impatient) critical decision on Housman's part. (Did such a beast ever exist?) The conservatism of a German scholar of the – albeit late – nineteenth century led him to omit explicit reference to the woman's breasts. If we deny him this we do him an injustice.

What Friedlaender left modestly unsaid, Housman has seized upon as being in need of 'correction and explanation'. Needless so.

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⁴ At least the obvious point, for I am still not wholly convinced that there is not a double reading of this couplet.

⁵ (And see above on [1]). The alternative reading *loturas*, evidently occasioned by the sex of Spatale, in an attempt to justify her presence at the baths, is of interest and worthy of brief comment. If the vulgate *loturos* is correct this is a clear case of mixed bathing. Either *loturos* is a general plural = men, women (and children?) in which case Spatale stands legitimately in the queue, or it means all-male bathers, and then the lady is out of place morally as well as grammatically. The suggested alteration *loturas*, on the other hand, squares perfectly with Spatale's female presence. Of course, there is a limit to which this matter is of any real importance (at least for our present purpose). I therefore conclude with a passage from J.Carcopino (*Daily Life in Ancient Rome*, trans. E.O.Lorimer, Peregrine Books 1962): 'In the days of Martial and Juvenal, under Domitian, and still under Trajan, there was no formal prohibition of mixed bathing. Women who objected to this promiscuity could avoid the *thermae* and bathe in the *balneae* provided for their exclusive use.' (p.281).

⁶ It is, of course, an editor's purpose and duty to spell things out, but we must draw a line between helpful guidance and needless spoon-feeding (*viz.* Delphin).

M. R. Mezzabotta (Cape Town): Johannes Burman,

LCM 15.7 (Jul.1990), 109-110

Catullus 3.11-14 and Virgil Aeneid 1.33

My thanks are due to Michael Wilson of the Archaeology Department of the South African Museum, Cape Town, for bringing Burman's works to my attention, and to Assoc. Prof. J.E. Atkinson for helpful comments.

Johannes Burman, physician and botanist, was born in 1707 in Amsterdam and died there in 1779. His botanical publications written in Latin are of immense interest to students of the flora of the Cape of Good Hope. As professor of botany at the Athenaeum, Amsterdam, and director of the botanical garden in that city, he enjoyed contacts with the Council of XVII, the Directors of the Dutch East India Company. From 1652 until the British annexed the Cape in 1795, the Dutch East India Company developed a settlement at the Cape of Good Hope to provision the Company's ships en route to and from the East. Cape Town thus originated as a victualling station. From officials of the company and from visitors to the Cape Burman obtained valuable information about the plants growing in this region, as well as some dried specimens and seeds. His *Thesaurus Zeylandicus* (1737), on the flora of Ceylon, included a supplement listing plants observed at the Cape by earlier botanists. This was followed by the publication of his *Decades Rariorum Africanarum Plantarum Ad Vivum Delineatarum* (1738-9), a treatise wholly devoted to the flora of the Cape. This and his previous work helped to make many Cape plants accessible to botanophiles in Europe.

Burman's *praefatio* to the *Decades Rariorum Africanarum Plantarum*, in which he addresses his readers as *Florae periti cultores*, contains literary allusions to Catullus and to Virgil. He relates that his own illness and the onerous duties of his work as a physician had decided him to postpone indefinitely his original intention of following his *Thesaurus Zeylandicus* with a similar treatise on African plants. He explains that on completion of the former work he had been prostrated by a severe illness of long duration, *adeo ut Orci limina fere detrusus tenebricosum illud, unde redire cuiquam negatur, ingressus fuerim iter . . .* (p.vi, lines 8-9). The bold type draws attention to the obvious echo of Catullus 3.11-14:

*qui nunc it per iter tenebricosum
illud, inde negant redire quemquam.
at vobis male sit, malae tenebrae
Orci . . .*

Through this allusion Burman likens his own near brush with death to the experience of 'Lesbia's' sparrow.

Further on in the *praefatio* the reader learns that Burman was given a copy of the Witsen codex, a hand-written and -illustrated description of the flora Capensis compiled in about 1692, containing details of several hitherto unpublished Cape plants. This chance acquisition immediately rekindled his enthusiasm for publishing a work on African plants. Burman states his intention of including only those plants which had been passed over or incorrectly described by earlier botanists, giving the following reasons:

*Quum vero expertus satis sim, quantae molis opus fit, totam peculiaris
alicujus regionis aut loci condere plantarum Syllogen, quumque ex nulla fere
alia terrarum parte tam varia et tanta plantarum copia, quanta ex Africa,
extremo orbis veluti angulo, proveniat . . .*

pr. p.v, line 27 - vi, line 2.

The structure and vocabulary of the clause *quantae molis . . . fit, totam . . . condere Syllogen* recall Virgil, *Aen.* 1.33, *tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem*. Through this literary reminiscence Burman cunningly suggests that the massive effort required to collect together data concerning all the plants of a particular place is to be compared with the mammoth task of founding the Roman race, and that the compilation of such a work, which he describes as *vastum certe ac nimis arduum* (*pr. p.vi, line 2*), would match the achievement of the *Aeneid* in scope and difficulty.

Both these literary allusions seem to me to be quite deliberate and not merely the product of unconscious memory. Burman counts on his reader's recollection of the original sources to add the bond of shared knowledge to the more immediate linking factor of interest in botany. The reminiscences suggest that close study of at least some poems of Catullus (presumably poem 3 would not be studied in isolation from poem 2) and of a cardinal passage of the *Aeneid*¹ formed a memorable part of the education of eighteenth century Dutch gentlemen. They show also that evidence for the *Nachleben* of Catullus and Virgil is not confined to purely literary works but may surface in material of a technical nature.

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Review: **Pamela M. Huby** (Tunbridge Wells)

LCM 15.7 (Jul.1990), 110-112

A.W.Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989. Pp.xiv + 264. Cloth, £22.50 ISBN 0-19-824964-0.

'Psychologists have theories for most aspects of human behaviour. One where the studies are only in their infancy is love. There are many different approaches . . . a taxonomy of affection, friendship, romance or altruism, . . . ideas of commitment or congruence. . . . [This new book starts] to establish a framework in which to rationalise one of the most fundamental phenomena of human interaction, which is extraordinarily different between cultures.' *Sunday Times*, 3/9/89.

'Meanwhile we muddle on, trying to make policy decisions on a host of issues ranging from censorship to permissiveness with almost zero knowledge about one of the most fundamental urges of human beings'. Barbara Amiel, *The Times*, 15/9/89.

These two statements, made within a single fortnight in 1989, highlight both the difficulties the ancient Greeks had in dealing with love and friendship, and the difficulties we have in dealing with their views. 'Love and friendship' is our standard way of referring to the subject-matter, but they are not exact equivalents for *eros* and *philia*. 'Love' is far too broad for *eros*, and *philia* far too broad for 'friendship'. It is not perhaps an accident that English students are still having to use Grant (1885), Stewart (1892) and Burnet (1900) as commentaries on the *Nichomachean Ethics*. One may guess that others have quailed at the thought of dealing fully with books 8 and 9.

It is true, however, that Grant (Essay II) places them high both in moral elevation and in philosophical interest. To others they may appear banal and/or irrelevant to modern thought. Even those who were not brought up to regard themselves, personally, as miserable sinners may still find it difficult to accept the glib division of mankind into the good, the bad, and the in-betweens. This in its turn makes uncongenial the view that true friendship can only exist between two good men even if 'man' embraces 'woman' here. Many of us, if it is put in these terms, would doubt our own goodness and feel uncomfortable at having to judge the goodness of our 'friends'. The culture gap is very wide here.

Unlike virtue and happiness, and *arete* and *eudaimonia*, friendship and love and *eros* and *philia* do not raise important philosophical questions. And if we look at the Greeks their remarks come under the headings of (a) logic-chopping or linguistic analysis (in dealing with the terms of the relationships of loving or being a friend to), (b) homespun psychology, and (c) sheer metaphysics.

Price is not alone, however, in seeing more in the Greeks than this. Indeed there has been a plethora of studies in this area recently. Price sees Plato and Aristotle as having the basic idea that 'one person's life may overflow into another's, so that helping the other is a way of serving oneself', and that their views 'promise to resolve the old dichotomy between egoism and altruism'. (If so, it

¹ At least one other passage from the *Aeneid* may have been in Burman's mind as he composed his *praefatio*. The choice of the forceful word *detrusus* in the phrase *ad Orci limina fere detrusus* (*Praef.* line 8) may depend on *Aen.* 7.773, . . . *Stygias detrusit ad undas*. *Aen.* 7.770-73 relates that Jupiter hurled Aesculapius down into the underworld with a thunderbolt for using his medical skill to restore Hippolytus to life. The description of the fate of the first doctor may well have remained in the mind of Burman the physician.

has taken them a long time to do it.) The method he uses to defend this view will for some be disconcerting. Much of what he writes is straightforward analysis of Plato's and Aristotle's arguments, most in a critical vein, showing how they have played on, or been misled by, ambiguities, or brought in extraneous matter. This is well done and might come from any competent philosopher of the analytical tradition. But there are extravaganzas, like an attempt to relate Diotima's account of survival to that of Derek Parfit. If she/Plato had had such an idea, we would not have had to wait for Parfit to put it forth. But having gone through such exercises he turns round and explains that behind it all Plato had a plan and has produced something of value, and Aristotle also really meant something of value to us today. He confesses to an anti-Vlastos attitude, and has critical remarks about Kant – 'the phantasy that morality marks the spot where human beings discard human nature' (from Richard Wolheim), which some may understand better than I do.

Much of the book is devoted to summaries of the relevant works, *Lysis*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and parts of the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*. There are independent chapters of *The Household* and *The City*. The epilogue, which some will see as sentimental nonsense, is from M. Guyau, a nineteenth-century Frenchman. There are then 43 pages of *Appendices*, on *Homogeneity and beauty in the Symposium*, directed against Martha Nussbaum, *Psychoanalysis looks at the Phaedrus*, for which Price uses a psychoanalyst, Thomas Ogden, as mentor, *Plato's sexual morality*, and *Aristotle on erotic love*.

For some people the *Lysis* is concerned with the special problem of a boy who needs a friend who will look after his true interests, the *Symposium*, while covering much ground through the speeches of the different participants, ends up with an ideal love which has little relevance to earthly needs, and the *Phaedrus* is unclear in intention and limited in its subject-matter to a special kind of *eros* that by its very nature cannot be of general application.

For Price the *Lysis* is the foundation of it all: 'Despite its failure either to define or to explain friendship, the *Lysis* succeeds in setting the scene for a genuine understanding; as Plato no doubt intended, it therefore constitutes a limited achievement under the guise of a fiasco' (Price's punctuation). It is the work 'that is the least dispensable'.

In the *Symposium* Price concentrates almost entirely on Diotima's reported views, and he gives a 'structured translation' of her programme. This brings out the difficulty that whereas in much of his work Plato can be seen as writing for all mankind, his proposals here seem to apply to a small minority of Greeks, and Greek males at that. So Price's questions seem remote: what happens to the individual as object of love? What kind of virtue is generated by the completion of the ascent, and in whom is it generated, only in the lover or also in a loved one? We are here merely interpreting Plato, not offering him to a wider world. Price, however, thinks otherwise. 'Plato's theories of love, here and in the *Phaedrus*, contain much that is unfamiliar to us, including many things that we would expect to find under another heading; but even here his topic emerges in the end as the one that we thought, only so transfigured that what had seemed only one aspect of life, dominant perhaps only at one time of life, turns out, fully developed and understood, to amount to the best life.'

If so, the best life is for few of us. It must by now be clear that I am baffled by much of what Price writes. I find a clue in his remark of the *Phaedrus*: 'The modern reader (especially if he proceeds straight from the schematic idealizations of the *Symposium*) is likely to be struck by a sudden breath of actuality. Some of the speech's themes may even strike us as Proustian.' Actuality? Proustian? The problem is that so much of what people imagine about love is derived from literature, or at any rate fiction, from Proust to Barbara Cartland, that it is difficult, as my opening quotations show, to get at the reality behind it all.

Price's themes are illuminated, or the reverse, by the use of commentators and others less commonly brought in, like Nietzsche, Auden, Baudelaire, Betjeman, Alfred Brendel, Albrecht Durer, Walter Pater (I would not have missed the information that 'in one shameless sentence Pater goes so far as to suppose that a young man's longing for the forms may be reciprocated') and Jean Buridan. This would be fine if Price were solely concerned with explaining Plato's thought, but he claims to be doing much more, and in that he seems to me to be going against much of Greek as well as more recent experience.

There is at least one word in my opening quotation that seems to find no home in the material we are considering, namely 'affection'. But it is difficult to believe that what it stands for had no place in Greek life. It is there in the epics and the tragedies and in the lyric poetry, Priam pleading for the body of Hector, Orpheus searching for Eurydice and Demeter for Persephone, Niobe weeping for her children, Alcestis – the list goes on and on. It is there on the gravestones and epitaphs throughout the Greek world. However much may be due to convention, these moving relics are evidence that family affection existed then as it does now. Or, again, consider the tale of a man whom Aristotle probably knew, as told in the *Suda* (s.v. *Leon*, no. 265 pp.247-8 Adler). A Peripatetic philosopher named Leo, from Byzantium, a pupil of Plato, or, as some say, of Aristotle, was very fat, and on an embassy to Athens he caused laughter because of his fat belly. Unabashed by the laughter he said: 'I have a wife much fatter, and when we are in agreement our bed is big enough for us, but when we differ not even the house is big enough for us.' The Athenians took the (political) point. That is, they understood very well that kind of affection. So in considering what Plato and Aristotle are concerned with, we should perhaps exclude affection, which is natural, and consider a more calculating kind of relationship between human beings. But even that will not do. Aristotle is firm that it is difficult to be friendly towards grumpy old people. This must surely be a denial of the possibility of affection, not of friendship, and even less so of *eros*. Again he does (1159a30) allow for unselfish mother-love, when a mother parts from her child for the good of that child.

In general, Aristotle lends himself to romantic treatment less easily than Plato. This may be because of the different kinds of works that have survived from the two men, but it is unlikely that the lost works of Aristotle were on a par with those of Plato on the imaginative level. What we have, at any rate, is much more workmanlike than Plato, but Price is able to give it the same treatment and argue that, rightly understood, under the ambiguities there are some excellent points. So, for him, 'Aristotle's account of "perfect" friendship amounts to an analysis of friendship as we conceive it.' Can that be true? And what of Aristotle's remark (1158b25) that in unequal friendships the better should (*δεῖ*) be loved more than he loves? What is this *δεῖ*? Price quotes the passage, and notes that it is 'superficially' inconsistent with the claim at 1167b17-18 that benefactors appear to love their beneficiaries more than the latter the former. But he does not resolve the inconsistency by pointing to the difference between the *δεῖ* of the first and the *δοκοῦσι* of the second. My question remains.

Let us approach the matter from a different angle. As far as *philia* goes, most of those to whom we have this relationship are not chosen by ourselves, namely our parents, brothers and sisters, and children, and while we do to some extent choose our friends, they are chosen from a small circle of schoolmates, workmates and the like. Further, biological considerations suggest that sexual attraction works in such a way that each individual favours a different partner. (That is not entirely true, but by and large people do pair off.) This idea is perhaps allowed for in Aristophanes' speech in the *Symposium*, but that has the implausible conclusion that there is only one right partner for each person, which again would be biologically difficult. In any case Price does not deal with that, and mentions the speech only in passing. So while Aristotle in particular does not ignore these facts, he does not treat them as being at the heart of his discussions. Both Plato and Aristotle were elitist in outlook. They were also ancient Greeks. On this subject they have little to say to most of us.

Addenda. Price treats the *NE* and the *EE* as close in time, with the *NE* aimed at a more popular audience than the *EE*. This is an interesting suggestion, but the differences between the two are so slight that it is difficult to imagine who these two audiences, who would both attend full courses on ethics, might be.

A curiosity of the British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data for this book is that the names of Aristotle and Plato are given twice in that order, and in each case 'Plato' is immediately followed by '384-22', the dates of Aristotle. The Library of Congress prudently gives no dates.